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THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. By Homer Carey
Hockett. New York: Macmillan Co., 1939. Vol. I, 1776-1826; vol. II, 1826-
1876. $3.00 per volume.
If the reader of Professor Hockett's Constitutional History picks up the
two volumes now published and gives them a glancing structural appraisal,
he is likely to observe that each of them covers precisely fifty years and
contains eighteen chapters, which leaves room for one more volume of the
same size to cover the third half century of our national history. This is
apt to convey the impression of an arbitrary time division, perhaps without
unity in each volume.
In reality, each of the volumes so far published covers a definite period
of constitutional growth, which merely happens to fit into a fifty-year time
cycle. The first volume, bearing the dates 1776-1826, covers the period from
the Declaration of Independence to the completion of Chief Justice Mar-
shall's nationalistic exposition of the American Constitution, but opens
with a preliminary survey starting with the gild system of medieval
England. The second volume treats of the period before and after the
Civil War when political democracy, slavery, and the beginnings of cor-
porate finance dominated the malleable material which we call a fixed
constitution. Had the author chosen to do so, he could have named his
two volumes "Construction" and "Reconstruction."
To the lawyer or other layman (from the standpoint of professors of
history, lawyers are laymen) constitutional history all too often begins with
the first federal court decision after the passage of the Judiciary Act of
1789 and is limited to citable and uncitable opinions of justices of the
Supreme Court-a sort of "on again, off again, gone again, Finnigan"
journey down a double track judicial railway with an uncertain roadbed.
Two of the most notable merits of the Hockett history are, first, that it
deals adequately, clearly, and accurately with the real beginnings of Amer-
ican constitutionalism, in the British constitution and the political and eco-
nomic struggle which culminated in the War of the American Revolution;
second, that it pursues the non-judicial lines of constitutional thought and
action in the United States which have co-existed with the work of the
Supreme Court and at times exerted a dominant pressure upon it.
The most notable defect in the work of Professor Hockett-indeed, the
only defect that seems worthy of notice-is a too-confident reliance upon
secondary authorities. This, in the opinion of this reviewer, has led to a
serious misinterpretation of the attitude of American political leaders to-
ward state and federal sovereignty during the revolutionary period from
1776 to 1783. If the interpretation thus accepted by Professor Hockett is
incorrect, the effect is to distort the later periods, even though they are
correctly presented. By blotting out of existence the nascent sense of na-
tionality in the American people, it fortifies the later extreme doctrine of
State Rights with a background which makes the nationalism of Marshall
appear as a violent act of necessity.
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It seems strange, in view of the high admiration expressed by Professor
Hockett for Justice Story's work on the bench, that he did not give more
weight to Story's view of constitutional principles under the Continental
Congress. If, in this field, one looks to secondary authorities, the choice
really lies between Justice Story and Professor Van Tyne. Story wrote
an undocumented, carefully reasoned statement of first principles putting
emphasis on federal origins of sovereignty. He was as near to the events
of which he wrote as a man of thirty, today, is to the World War. Professor
Van Tyne, a century later, wrote a heavily documented argument against
the existence of an early sense of nationhood. Professor Hockett follows
Van Tyne closely and gives credit to him for the fundamental position taken.
In this day of worship of footnotes, it is perhaps inevitable that teachers
of constitutional history should place the documented argument of Van
Tyne above the undocumented argument of Story, but it is not a safe
thing to do because Van Tyne's documentation fails to sustain his argu-
ment. The result is that a great formative epoch in American history is
presented in a way which colors-and this reviewer believes discolors-the
succeeding epoch.
Van Tyne says, and Hockett quotes him, that the Continental Congress
was "hardly more than a meeting of the agents appointed by the state
governments to make the action of the thirteen states uniform," and when-
ever the people of any state found it necessary to choose between obedience
to Congress and to the state government they obeyed the latter.
Suppose we examine the most important illustration cited by Van Tyne to
support his theory-an assertion that the Maryland Convention of 1779
denied the existence of power in Congress. On this Van Tyne says:
As the Maryland convention expressed it, "the best and only proper
exercise [of the powers of Congress] can be in adopting the wisest
measures for equally securing the rights and liberties of each of the
United States, which was the principle of their union."'
If Professor Hockett and other followers of Van Tyne had taken the trouble
to look up the authority cited by Van Tyne for that quotation (Scharf's
History of Maryland), they would have found the statement of the Maryland
convention to be as follows:
This convention have a strong disinclination to go into any discussion
of the powers with which the congress is invested, being fully sensible
that the general interest will not be promoted by either the congress
affirming, or this convention denying, the existence of A FULLNESS
OF POWER in that honorable body; the best and only proper exercise
of which can be * * *
Not only did Van Tyne garble the words of the Maryland convention to
prove his point, but he squarely reversed the implications of the resolution,
for Maryland was seeking to have Congress assert and exercise authority
over the British crown lands claimed by the "back land" states. "Equally
securing the rights and liberties" of each of the states meant that Congress
should take land away from Virginia for the benefit of Maryland.
1. C. H. Van Tyne, Sovereignty in the American Revolution: An His-
torical Study (1907) 12 The American Historical Review 529, 535.
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Had Professor Hockett not been misled by the current worship of Van
Tyne among historians who have accepted his documentation without look-
ing up his documents, this part of his work would no doubt be as valid as
the rest of it, which has an admirable balance and perspective, testifying
to the fairmindedness of its author.
Acceptance of the theory that there was no federal sovereignty in the
Continfental Congress prior to adoption of the Articles of Confederation in
1781 produces queer results when applied to treaties of alliance and ex-
change of ambassadors, and also requires forced interpretations of domestic
acts of legislation. Thus, Professor Hockett describes the early resolution
of Congress prescribing rules for disposition of maritime prizes, and provid-
ing for appeals to Congress from state admiralty courts, as something
originating in state sovereignty: "the authority of Congress to hear appeals
was found in the response of the states to the recommendation of that body
that they establish their own admiralty courts."
It is astonishing that such a statement should be made when it is con-
trary to the implications of all the cases in which disputes occurred bearing
on it. When the federal Commissioners of Appeal contravened Pennsylvania
law in hearing an appeal in the famous Olmstead capture of 1778, when the
Continental Congress upheld the powers of the commissioners against the
protest of Pennsylvania, and when the United States Supreme Court in
1809 enforced the original Olmstead 2 decision, these bodies did not find that
the authority of the Continental Congress grew out of the action of the
states in setting up admiralty courts. On the contrary, they affirmed the
supremacy of the acts of the Continental Congress over the conflicting ad-
miralty law of the State of Pennsylvania, and in the Penhallow=3 case the
Supreme Court did the same thing in regard to the State of New Hampshire.
In both instances, appeals were taken, heard, decided, upheld, and finally
enforced, contrary to the state law involved. Professor Hockett describes
these cases fully, but fails to realize that they destroy the theory accepted
from Van Tyne about the absence of federal sovereignty before the Articles
of Confederation came into effect. That theory is still less supportable when
applied to the treaties negotiated, alliances formed, and ministers exchanged
between the United States and foreign countries from the very beginning
of an independent existence. The judicial record thus supports Story's view
that national sovereignty was in Congress from the moment of independence,
but that power to uphold it did not come until 1789.
Professor Hockett's description of the work of the Federal Convention of
1787 contains a clear statement of the relationship of the changes in form
of government to the political, economic, and social views of the period, and
makes a fair apportionment of credit for the new constitution. He aids
in the belated recognition of James Wilson of Pennsylvania as one of the
"great democrats of the formative period of the Republic'-ranking him
with James Otis, Thomas Jefferson, George Mason, and James Madison,
which probably overrates Otis as a democrat, though not as a formative
2. United States v. Judge Peters (U. S. 1809) 5 Cranch 115.
3. Penhallow v. Doane's Adm'rs (U. S. 1795) 3 Dall. 54.
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force. Though Wilson's views were not fully embodied in the Constitution,
his utterances deserve the credit given them as "prophetic of the time to
come when new western states would democratize the nation." The grouping
of these five men as great democrats emphasizes the truth of Hockett's
statement that "the delegates did not intend to establish a democratic
government." Two of the five, Otis and Jefferson, were not framers of the
Constitution, Mason refused to sign it because it lacked a Bill of Rights,
Madison did not pursue the democratic line until after the Constitution
was ratified, and Wilson, as stated, was a prophet of democracy rather than
an achiever of it in 1787.
In describing constitutional development after the new government came
into being, Professor Hockett shows discernment and discrimination in
treating the struggle between Jefferson and Hamilton, the shift of Madison
to Jefferson's support, and the political struggle over Internal Improvements,
as factors in constitutional development to be studied along with the
federalist trend of the Supreme Court under Marshall and his predecessors.
This makes it easier to understand how, despite Marshall's overwhelming
victory in constitutional interpretation, the Jeffersonian doctrine of state
sovereignty came back in later years as an influence driving the South to-
ward secession. When the protection of slavery was seen to hinge on con-
stitutional interpretation, the slave holders seized on the Virginia and Ken-
tucky resolutions against the Sedition Act of 1798 as justification for nulli-
fication and secession, and all the protests of Madison could not obscure the
fact that he and Jefferson had furnished good ammunition for them to use,
even if they had not furnished it intentionally.
Professor Hockett rallies to Madison's support, rather more strongly
than the record warrants, in defending him from the charge, based on
Genet's garbling of Yates's notes of June 6, 1787 on the Federal Convention,
that Madison in helping to frame the Constitution had advocated doing
away with state governments. Madison's own notes (published after his
death) show that he said on June 28, 1787:
In a word; the two extremes before us are a perfect separation and a
perfect incorporation, of the 13 states. In the first case they would be
independent nations subject to no law, but the law of nations. In the
last, they would be mere counties of one entire republic, subject to one
common law. In the first case the smaller states would have every thing
to fear from the larger. In the last they would have nothing to fear.
The true policy of the small states therefore lies in promoting those
principles and that form of government which will most approximate
the states to the condition of counties.
If Madison's opponents in the 1808 presidential election had possessed this
quotation, they could have used it more effectively than they did the less
accurate and more sweeping one from Yates, because the words were put
down by Madison himself. This suggests that Madison's aversion to con-
stitutional interpretations based on recollections of what took place during
the framing of the Constitution was not due so much to the faulty memory
of others, as Hockett surmises, as to his own clear memory of his earlier
hostility to states' rights.
History, however, was being made at that time by current stresses, not
1940]
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by recollections. The step taken by Andrew Jackson in dealing with South
Carolina's attempt at nullification is characterized by Professor Hockett
with a terse exactness which makes it an offset to the whole course of state
and slave ascendancy in the Supreme Court of Chief Justice Taney:
If Jackson had supinely acquiesced in nullification, a chain of events
would have followed which might have made the preservation of the
Union impossible in 1861. Jackson, indeed, may be said to have made
Lincoln's role possible.
The chapters dealing with constitutional history after the Civil War
have an especial value today because they treat extensively of the relation-
ship between civil liberties and war-engenderd passions. Chief Justice Taney
is given credit for a sincere defense of the rights of citizens during the
War, when he was being overridden as a judicial ally of the seceded states;
and the later return of the court to support of civil rights, in Ex parto
Milligan especially, is characterized as a posthumous justification of Taney.
At the same time, quotations from the press of the day, and from congres-
sional leaders, suggest the frailty of the judicial arm as a protection in
wartime of rights that theoretically belong to Americans in both peace and
war.
The vast field of constitutional history covered by the industrial and
corporate development after 1876 is left to the third volume, not yet pub-
lished. It is foreshadowed, of course, in the discussion of the transition from
the Marshall to the Taney court-from the Dartmouth College case to the
Charles River Bridge case. In dealing with the economic aspects of the
American Revolution, Professor Hockett points out that parliamentary
supremacy, against which the colonies revolted, was really supremacy by the
same English mercantile class which in 1688, in conjunction with the landed
interest, had used parliament as a weapon against the king. Dealing with
the next great crisis, Hockett gives weight to the impact of slavery upon
American constitutional development. The ultimate value of his consti-
tutional history will depend upon his treatment, in the volume yet to be
published, of the economic forces which have dominated the constitutional
struggle of the last three-quarters of a century. If he can deal as realis-
tically, at close range, with the forces which have enjoyed judicial su-
premacy since 1876, as he has dealt with those which attempted to force
parliamentary supremacy before 1776, the work will take high rank as a
study of the forces governing our constitutional development, as well as
an accurate outline of institutional growth under the document whose not-
Lo-fixed terms became effective in 1789. IRVING BRANT.t
THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION. By Thomas K. Finletter.
Charlottesville: The Michie Company, 1939. Pp. x, 994. $10.00.
One of the most interesting developments in the legal literature of the
last decade has been the great increase in the number of worthwhile books
in the field of insolvent estates. Of these, a full share have been devoted to
corporate reorganization, the general subject covered in the volume under
review.
-I Contributing Editor, St. Louis Star-Times.
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